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Abstract
This article addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international
organisations cease to exist. International Relations literature offers rich explanations
for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and their organi-
sational embodiments, international organizations (IOs), but surprisingly little effort has
gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand the
conditions under which international organisations endure, we must also explain why
they frequently fail to do so. The article formulates and tests a theory of ‘IO death’ using
a combination of population-wide statistical analysis and detailed historical case studies.
My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815–2016. I find that
exogenous shocks are a leading proximate cause of IO terminations since 1815 and that
organisations that are newly created, have small memberships, and/or lack centralised
structures are most likely to succumb. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of
extensions and refinements to existing institutionalist theories.
Keywords
Intergovernmental organisations, international institutions, institutional termination and
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On 14 November 1936, Germany withdrew from the international conventions estab-
lishing the International Commissions of the Danube, the Elbe, and the Oder, and the
Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine. Although they were never officially
dissolved, the Elbe, Oder and Danube River Commissions never convened again,
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whereas the Rhine Commission operates to this day, making it the oldest international
organisation (IO) in modern history. On 31 March 1991, members of the Warsaw Pact
voted to terminate the alliance in light of monumental geopolitical changes following the
end of the Cold War. The Pact thus joined the long list of institutionalised multilateral
alliances that have been eventually relegated to history.1 By contrast, its western
counterpart, NATO, went on to expand its membership and mission, leading interna-
tional relations scholars to hail it as an exemplar of the remarkable durability of inter-
national institutions (McCalla, 1996; Menon and Welsh, 2011; Wallander, 2000).
Why do IOs (sometimes) die? Why some IOs and not others? From the perspective of
existing scholarly literature, IO terminations present a puzzle. An extensive literature in
International Relations asserts that international institutions and organisations are the
products of costly negotiation and contracting processes that are far too deeply ingrained
in wider social and political structures to suddenly nullify (Cotrell, 2016: 21; Strange,
1998). Functionalist theories invoke high negotiating costs and ‘increasing returns’ from
institutionalised cooperation to ground the notion that states will maintain existing
institutions as long as feasible and – at any rate – ‘long after the original conditions for
their creation have disappeared’ (Keohane, 1984: 215; Stein, 1990: 50). Sociological
institutionalists emphasise normative and cognitive biases leading to ‘competency traps’
and institutional status quo bias (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; March and Olsen, 1998:
964). Historical institutionalists cite positive feedback and institutional lock-in effects
(North, 1990: 95; Pierson, 2004), while organisational theorists highlight international
secretariats’ strategic use of bureaucratic resources to resist obsolescence (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004; Shanks et al., 1996: 593). While they start from different theoretical
assumptions, these perspectives all share in common the assumption that institutional
change is predominantly incremental, and institutional deaths rare (Cappoccio and
Kelemen, 2007; Cotrell, 2016: 21; North, 1990: 89–94). As Shanks and co-authors
(1996: 593) summarise, ‘no-body expects public institutions to die’.
IOs do of course die. Of 561 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) created between
1815 and 2006, 216 (about two-fifths) have since ceased to exist (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni,
2018). Why, given the high costs of creating international institutions and the lasting
benefits they allegedly produce, do states frequently abandon established IOs? Under
what specific conditions are IOs most likely to terminate? Existing IR scholarship
provides surprisingly limited analytical leverage on these questions. For decades,
scholars have focused on explaining patterns of institutional creation and design, and on
theorising ‘institutional robustness’ – understood broadly as ‘the ability of international
institutions to endure despite exogenous change’ (Hasenclever et al., 1992: 2, my
emphasis).2 This lopsided focus on explaining institutional endurance (rather than ter-
mination) has led to widespread selection bias, insofar as scholars have systematically
favoured the study of the living over the dead.3 Thus, many studies of institutional
robustness focus rather one-sidedly on a handful of long-lasting IGOs while ignoring
prominent organisational failures. For example, the substantial literature focused on
explaining NATO’s persistence after the Cold War contains surprisingly few references
– let alone focused comparison – to former institutionalised alliances that dissolved once
exogenous threats subsided (McCalla, 1996; Menon and Welsh, 2011; Wallander 2000.
cf. Lake, 2001). This bias has led scholars to widely overestimate institutional
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robustness, while downplaying processes that undermine institutionalised cooperation.
On the flipside, the comparatively sparse literature on the collapse of international
institutions has tended to focus on single cases (Bernholz, 2009) or has concentrated on
smaller segments of the population (Cotrell, 2016; Gray, 2018; Panke and Petersohn,
2011; Shanks et al., 1996).4 Limited by functional specificities and historical con-
tingency, such studies fail to offer a general explanation of IO death that can account for
mortality patterns across a wider universe of cases.
This article aims fill to this gap by providing a theory-based analysis of IGO death
since 1815. It builds on and extends my earlier statistical analysis of IGO deaths
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018) by formulating and testing specific theoretical conjectures,
and by supplementing population-wide analysis with detailed case studies of organisa-
tional terminations during historical ‘high stress’ periods. Previous research has estab-
lished that IGO terminations correlate with geopolitical shocks and with specific
institutional traits such as small membership size (opcit.). Yet, without knowing how
these factors contribute to institutional demise in specific cases, we cannot confidently
claim to understand what causes organisational termination as opposed to endurance. My
ambition in this article is thus to distinguish various factors and processes that may lead
to IGO death, to identify the circumstances under which these processes are likely to
occur, and to establish, though careful process-tracing analysis, how they unfold in
specific cases.
My discussion is structured as follows. ‘Data and Methods’ introduces the data and
methodology underlying my analysis. ‘Key concepts’ outlines central concepts relevant
to my study. The following section, ‘IGO mortality 1815–2016: descriptive statistics’,
records broad historical patterns of IGO mortality to motivate my research question(s),
and to identify historical periods and organisational features of particular interest. In the
section ‘Theorising IGO death’, I draw on institutionalist theories to derive hypotheses
about the causes of IGO termination. The section titled ‘Empirics: exogenous change and
IGO death’ turns to fine-grained empirical analysis, combining medium-n statistical
analysis with historical case studies. In conclusion, I discuss implications of my findings
for existing institutional theories.
Theoretical contribution
My analysis contributes to several avenues of IO research. First, by moving beyond a
focus on single cases of IO failure, this study contributes novel insights regarding when
and how international institutions die. Second, in doing so, it also helps to refine existing
theories of what allows some IOs to endure. As already discussed, studies of institutional
robustness have predominantly focused on highly robust IOs. We are, however, unlikely
to discover factors responsible for organisational robustness by examining only long-
lived exemplars. Long-lived IOs may share certain features but without carefully
examining organisations that did not last, we cannot say whether and specifically how
they differed. By bringing to light new data on dissolved IGOs, the present study
facilitates testing of extant institutionalist theories against a larger range of cases and




My analysis is based on an expanded version of the Dead-IGO (DIGO-20185) Dataset,
which contains information on all IGOs created between 1815 and 2006, tracking their
fate until 2016. This dataset includes most IGOs listed in the Correlates of War (COW)
IGO-Datasets (version 2.3) plus an additional 36 IGOs not included in the COW
Datasets. In addition to listing the fate of each IGO (‘defunct’ or ‘operational’) as of
2016, the dataset codes institutional features including Number of state parties, Scope
and Type of mandate, Centralization,6 organisational Age and Geographic Span (an
explanation of coding criteria is in the Codebook).
My analysis relies on an integrated, mixed-methods approach, which combines
population-wide statistical analysis with detailed historical case studies. Starting with
population-wide analysis is necessary for two reasons. First, it is possible that IGO
terminations may be driven by different antecedent conditions in different segments of
the population. However, without first observing variation across the entire population,
we cannot know for sure what the relevant segments might be. Second, single or small-n
studies of IGO death, while useful for allowing observation of discrete causal processes,
have distinct liabilities when used as a source of development of concepts and
hypotheses about variation in IGO mortality (Lieberman 2004). As Pierson notes (2004:
141), reliance on single cases often leads scholars to focus on immediate sources of
institutional change – the ‘catalysts’ – but have a harder time identifying the role of
underlying structural factors. Because they present isolated studies of institutional col-
lapse at particular points in time, we cannot be certain what factors are important in
generating the observed outcomes (opcit.). Starting with population-wide statistical
analysis allows me to identify broad regularities, which may serve as a source of
hypothesis development. In a second step, I formulate and test specific theoretical
conjectures using a combination of medium-n statistical analysis and detailed case
studies designed to establish whether particular causal mechanisms are present in spe-
cific cases and produce the expected outcome(s) in the ways predicted by my theoretical
conjectures. The synergistic value of treating statistical analysis both as a source of
theory development and a guide to case-selection has been widely recognised (Liber-
mann, 2005; Mahoney, 2008; Rohlfing, 2008). As Liebermann notes such a ‘nested
analysis’ approach is ‘particularly beneficial when the overall state of theory in cross-
national research is relatively thin with respect to the questions being asked’ so that
empirical analysis is required both to develop hypotheses and to test them (2005: 438).
Key concepts
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly clarify the basic unit of analysis and thus
delimit the universe of cases. The international institutions that are the focus of this
study are formal IGOs established by charter or treaty, as opposed to looser collections
of unwritten rules, norms or conventions. To qualify as an IGO, an international
organization must have a written charter, at least three sovereign parties and an
independent administrative apparatus, such as a permanent secretariat or staff (Peve-
house et al., 2004).7
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The termination of formal IGOs must be clearly distinguished from situations in
which deep-seated informal norms and practices lose their prescriptive status. Such cases
have been the focus of previous studies of how norm-contestation may trigger institu-
tional change (Cotrell, 2009, 2016; Panke and Petersohn, 2011). I limit my analysis to
formal IGOs for both conceptual and theoretical reasons. First, unlike informal institu-
tions whose norms and principles may gradually cease to inform state behaviour, formal
IGOs can be explicitly terminated through legal procedures, making their death rela-
tively easier to ‘diagnose’ (Reus-Smit, 2007). Second, theoretical predictions regarding
institutional robustness are generally stronger for formal, ‘parchment’ institutions
(Carey, 2000). For example, both rational choice and historical institutionalist theories
hold that formal rules and norms make for stronger focal points and generate greater
path-dependent effects than their informal counterparts (e.g. Jupille et al. 2013 Pierson,
2004: 143). Being generally forecast to be highly robust, the death of formal IGOs thus
presents a promising starting point for learning about causes of institutional death.
Ways to die
In legal terms, IGOs can terminate through five broad processes: their founding treaties
can expire; they can be explicitly dissolved by state parties; they can be formally
replaced by, or merged with, other organisations; or they can simply fall into disuse for a
prolonged period (usually stipulated as 10 years or longer) after which they are no longer
considered to have a binding effect on members8 (for a detailed discussion of
mechanisms of IGOs termination, see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018).
IGO mortality 1815–2016: descriptive statistics
While we know a great deal about the processes leading to IGO creation, we know much
less about the conditions under which IGOs die. As a starting point for further analysis,
this section therefore presents descriptive statistics on IGO deaths during the past two
centuries.
Figure 1 depicts rates of IGO creation and termination globally since 1815. It shows
that global termination rates increased sharply during decades marked by broad geo-
political upheaval, with the highest death-ratios (deaths in proportion to existing pop-
ulation) recorded during the 1930s and 1940s (coinciding broadly with the Great
Depression and World War II), followed by the 1910s and 1990s (coinciding with World
War I and the end of the Cold War).
Figure 2 shows deaths by geographic region. It shows that whereas death ratios
peaked in Europe during the World Wars, and in the Americas between 1910 and 1930,
deaths on the African continent climbed sharply between 1950 and 1970 – coinciding
with the largest wave of decolonisation.
Historical and geographic fluctuations in IGO deaths may provide general clues about
what causes organisational deaths to spike, but they tell us little about what kinds of IGOs
die under what specific circumstances. To provide a more detailed picture, I report
results of a Cox proportional hazard analysis, which measures IGO mortality according
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Figure 2. IGO deaths as a proportion (%) of incumbent population (according to geography –
selected regions).
Reproduced from Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018
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Appendix). Using a historical event analysis method, this model measures relative
mortality by considering the amount of time an IGO has been in existence before death
strikes.9
The model shows that the size of an IGO’s membership is a statistically strong pre-
dictor of death, with an inverse correlation between number of member states and risk of
termination. On its own, however, this finding must be treated with caution: IGOs that
produce significant benefits for states may attract more members, implying that size may
be confounded with other potentially survival enhancing factors, such as organisational
‘effectiveness’.
In terms of function, IGOs focused on security and judicial matters display the highest
mortality rates, followed by IGOs focused on trade and economic and social policy,
whereas IGOs that handle predominantly technical matters (such as scientific and
standard setting bodies) have lower mortality. Across the period, security organisations
are more than twice as likely to terminate as ‘technical’ IGOs.
Turning to age, hazard analysis shows that an IGO’s survival chances drop sharply
during the first three decades of its existence, then decline at a slower rate between 30
and 50 years, only to stabilise at around 50 years (Figure 3, Appendix). In other words,
once an IGO makes it through a perilous youth during which it is highly liable to ter-
mination, its immediate termination risk declines.
To summarise, population-wide analyses across two centuries show that IGO death
rates vary according to both exogenous factors such as geopolitical upheaval and to
intrinsic features such as membership, function and organisational age, which may serve
as either independent or intervening causal variables. This raises important questions for
further study: how specifically may geopolitical turmoil undermine IGOs? How, and to
what extent, may endogenous factors such as a large membership reduce risks of ter-
mination? To probe deeper into these questions, we need an explicit theory of IGO death
to guide analysis.
Theorising IGO death
Debates in IR about the creation and endurance of international institutions have tra-
ditionally been anchored in three main paradigms: power-based (or realist) accounts,
interest-based (or ‘functionalist’) accounts and social constructivism (see Cotrell, 2016).
These theoretical clusters focus on different variables – geopolitical, economic or
social – which generate important institutional outcomes. In recent decades, IR scholars
have also increasingly turned to historical institutionalism to examine how temporal
processes such as ‘critical junctures’ and path-dependent processes shape international
institutions (Fioretos, 2011, 2017; Pierson, 2004; Rixen et al. 2016).
My discussion centres chiefly on three clusters of theoretical arguments: power-based
and functionalist accounts and historical institutionalism (HI). As discussed, given a
predominant focus on theorising barriers to institutional change, neither cluster of the-
ories offer explicit predictions about when IGOs may be forsaken by their creators.
However, this does not imply they cannot potentially explain what ‘kills’ IGOs. By
identifying sources of institutional robustness, existing theories implicitly provide a
starting point for explaining the opposite outcome: institutional collapse. From the
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perspective of extant theory, IGO deaths may be simply viewed as theoretically expected
events (endurance) that fail to materialise, prompting us to ask whether causal factors
believed to underpin institutional robustness are absent in these cases (see van Evera,
1997). Admittedly, this approach has shortcomings. Most obviously, absence of hypo-
thesised ‘robustness-enhancing’ factors is unlikely to be a direct cause IGO death, but
may be merely an intervening or contributing factor (in much the same way as immu-
nodeficiency is not a direct cause of death in a biological organism but merely a factor
increasing susceptibility to disease). Nevertheless, by theorising sources of institutional
robustness, existing institutionalist theories can help to identify specific candidate fac-
tors (exogenous or endogenous to institutions) that may serve to disrupt entrenched
institutional equilibria, while simultaneously focusing attention on underlying structural
factors that may account for systemic variation in organisational survivability.
It is important to clarify that I do not intend my formulation of hypotheses to usher in
a competitive test of rival theoretical paradigms. Rather, my aim is to combine insights
from major institutionalist theories to build towards an understanding of what causes
IGO death. As many scholars have observed (e.g. Fioretos, 2011, 2017; Pierson, 2004),
rather than theoretical competitors, functionalist and power-based theories (which stress
various degrees of state rationality) and HI approaches are often complementary – each
emphasising different aspects of institutional processes that may produce institutional
stability or change. For example, by focusing on the utility of institutions to states, both
power-based and functionalist theories draw attention to how factors exogenous to
institutions (such as war or economic depression) may alter existing balances of power
and interests and lead to ‘punctuated equilibria’ (Krasner, 1984) characterised by rapid
institutional change. While having less to say about processes exogenous to institutions,
HI scholars call attention to temporal processes such as positive feedback, sequencing,
duration and timing, which can enrich thinner rationalist conceptualisations of
‘increasing returns’ from institutions. Such temporal processes may result in gradual
institutional reinforcement or gradual deterioration, possibly culminating in institutional
death (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 344; Fioretos, 2017: 15; Pierson, 2004; Rixen et al.,
2016). By combining insights from these perspectives, I thus seek an explanation of IGO
death that integrates exogenous forces and intrinsic institutional features.
Exogenous shocks and IGO death
From the perspective of realist, power-based theory, international institutions are created
and maintained by powerful states to advance national interests. Since they serve the
needs of powerful patrons, institutions are expected to change following major shifts in
international power balances. War and economic crisis feature heavily in such accounts
(Fioretos, 2017). For example, a large literature examines how abrupt power shifts – such
as those triggered by the Napoleonic wars, the World Wars or the Great Depression –
create opportunities for newly powerful states to remake the international system in
accordance with their own interests by putting in place institutions that increase returns
to their power and ‘lock in’ their privileged position (Gilpin, 1981: 36; Gunitsky, 2017;
Hanrieder, 2015; Mearsheimer, 1995: 7,13).
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Power-based accounts often focus on historical crises or ‘critical junctures’ as starting
points rather than end points. Thus, historic power shifts are widely depicted as
‘founding moments’ ushering in new institutional orders from which a range of positive
feedbacks flow (e.g. Ikenberry, 2001). In this spirit, scholars have lavished significantly
greater attention on the ‘grand institutional bargains’ struck at Versailles (1919) and
Bretton Woods (1944) than on pre-existing institutional arrangements that fell by the
wayside. If we turn the gaze around, however, a power-based logic suggests that major
power shifts will undermine IGOs that privilege the interests of no-longer powerful
patrons while leaving intact organisations that accommodate the interests of newly
powerful states. A power-based institutional logic also offers a further insight. Since
existing institutions presumably favour traditionally powerful states, the push to dis-
mantle existing IGOs can be expected to come from newly powerful states that feel
disadvantaged by the institutional status quo (Jupille et al., 2013: 43; Lipscy, 2015).
Hypothesis 1a. IGO deaths are caused by major shifts in international power bal-
ances, which reduce the power of existing institutional patrons vis-à-vis institutional
challengers.
Whereas realists ask whether institutions serve the needs of powerful states, func-
tionalist theories focus greater attention on collective benefits from institutions (Han-
rieder, 2015; Pierson, 2004). Borrowing from new institutional economics, functionalist
scholars hold that states create international institutions to reduce the transactions costs
of cooperation – chiefly through supply of information and by creating ‘focal points’ for
cooperation. A premise of functionalist institutionalism is that designing effective
institutions involves high start-up costs, whereas benefits created by institutions increase
with continued use thanks to scale economies, coordination and learning effects. Thus,
‘once a given institutional equilibrium has been reached, substantial changes in the
environment are necessary to alter it’ (Hanrieder, 2015: 17; Jupille et al., 2013; Keohane,
1984: 101–102). Nevertheless, states are expected to abandon existing institutions if they
no longer seem to present efficient solutions to joint cooperation problems (Jupille et al.,
2013; Stein, 1990: 50–51).
Observationally, a functionalist or ‘efficiency-based’ logic is difficult to distinguish
from a power-based logic at the population-level. Presumably, exogenous shocks in the
form of major wars or economic depression that trigger shifts in relative state power may
also reduce the expected utility to states individually and collectively of adhering to
existing institutional equilibria. Yet by conceiving of institutional efficiency in terms of
collective gains rather than ‘private’ benefits to powerful states, functionalism highlights
that IGO terminations may reflect changes in state preferences independently of shifts in
relative power. Furthermore, functionalists emphasise that institutions – once created –
give rise to ‘permanently useful resources’, which facilitate cooperation in a variety of
different contexts (Keohane, 1984: 102). This implies that, when faced with new
problems, states will usually seek to reform existing institutions rather than discard them
(ibid., p.107). Thus, in contrast to a power-based logic, a functionalist logic suggests that
the termination of IGOs following exogenous shocks should reflect broad disenchant-
ment (possibly reflecting unsuccessful attempts at reform), rather than (simply) direct
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power competition. Given that these different rationales may be difficult to discern at the
population level, whether an efficiency-based or power-based rationale best explains
IGO deaths is best determined through closer examination of smaller sets of cases.
Hypothesis 1b: IGO deaths are triggered by major political and economic changes or
shocks, which reduce the collective utility to states of adhering to existing institutions.
Endogenous factors: adaptability as a function of scope, centralisation and size
Whether one adopts a power-based or efficiency-based rationale for the creation and
maintenance of international institutions, a brief historical survey of IGO deaths (see the
section, ‘IGO mortality 1815–2016’ above), suggests that exogenous shocks alone are
insufficient to explain variation in IGO terminations. Wars and economic depression
may undermine many IGOs, but many more survive. To explain IGO death, we thus need
a systemic theory that explains why some organisations cope better with exogenous
shocks than others.
A starting point for such a theory is to consider variation in IGOs’ capacity for
adaptation. Faced with an exogenous shock, an IGO’s continued utility – whether to
powerful states or wider stakeholders – may depend on how easily it can be adapted to
changing circumstances. A useful conceptualisation of institutional adaptability is pro-
vided by Wallander (2000: 706) who theorises an IO’s adaptability as a function of
whether its organisational assets – its principles, rules and procedures – are ‘specific’ or
‘general.’ Specific assets facilitate particular transactions for a specific purpose, and
confer efficiency gains for those particular transactions, whereas general assets confer
efficiency gains on a variety of different transactions in different contexts (opcit; Keo-
hane, 1984: 90). Although asset specificity may be a function of multiple factors, this
logic suggests that IGOs with broad mandates that span several different functions or
policy areas will be more adaptable on average than IGOs that serve a narrowly defined
purposes for which they may have developed highly specialised routines and expertise.
Adaptability may also depend on centralisation. As Wallander explains, ‘general
assets’ are assets that enable states to cooperate efficiently in a variety of contexts by
providing information and by establishing clear rules for negotiation, decision-making,
monitoring and dispute resolution, which reduce transaction costs and increase trans-
parency (2000: 707). IGOs that offer centralised information provision, decision-making
and implementation can thus be said to be rich on ‘general assets’, which confer effi-
ciency gains on a variety of different transactions. From a functionalist perspective, this
should enhance their adaptability to environmental change.10
A third aspect of adaptability is size. Population-wide hazard analysis (Table 1,
Appendix) showed an inverse relationship between the size of an IGO’s membership and
its termination risk. As discussed, this correlation may be spurious. There are, however,
several theoretical reasons to expect that size may affect mortality. The more members an
IGO has, the larger the number of patrons to whom its functions are of potential future
value, and that have expended resources to create dedicated bureaucratic structures to
support its functions. For example, most countries have established permanent diplomatic
missions to IOs like the UN, EU and WTO and created national bodies tasked with
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overseeing implementation of conventions and decrees issued by these organisations,
thereby creating strong stakes in their perpetuation at the domestic level (Strange, 1998).
All else equal, the more state members an IGO has, the broader interests will be vested in
its continued existence. Thus, much like banks, some IOs may be ‘too big to fail’.
Size may also reduce vulnerability to exogenous shocks by ‘spreading risk’ (Ranger-
Moore, 1997: 904–905). Whereas IGOs with small membership may be vulnerable to
changes in the political situation of a single member-state, IGOs whose membership
spans many countries may be able to ‘average outcomes’ across members, thus reducing
vulnerability to country- or region-specific shocks (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018). To
illustrate: a global trade organisation with 150 members will not be fatally undermined if
a few members become embroiled in conflict or withdraw, whereas an IGO with just
three members would cease to exist if one party exited.
It is important to acknowledge that size might be hypothesised to have the opposite
effect. More member states tend to imply greater preference heterogeneity, which might
reduce organisational flexibility by multiplying veto-points.11 But whereas large size
may diminish organisational capacity to respond flexibly to environmental demands, it
may nonetheless increase adaptability understood as ‘resilience.’ Specifically, organi-
sational adaptability does not necessarily require agent-driven strategic flexibility but
may simply entail that an IGO holds continued value for a sufficient number of stake-
holders despite changed circumstances to attract necessary political and financial sup-
port. Thus, while large size may reduce one aspect of adaptability – strategic flexibility –
it may nonetheless increase an IGO’s ability to accommodate exogenous change.
From this analysis, we can identify three intrinsic factors – narrow mandate, low
centralisation and small size – that are likely to increase IGO mortality by lowering
adaptability to change. I hypothesise that death becomes more likely if any of these
causes are present, but especially so when they exist in combination.12 I further hypo-
thesise that these factors will be particularly consequential in conjunction with exo-
genous shocks. A narrow mandate or small size may not severely penalise an IGO during
periods of relative stability. However, such liabilities are likely to prove more decisive in
rapidly changing environments when institutions come under strong pressure to adapt.
Hypothesis 2: IGOs are more liable to terminate if they have (i) small membership,
(ii) narrow scope and (iii) low centralisation. The liability of these intrinsic features
increases in rapidly changing environments.
Reconciling exogenous and endogenous factors: timing and sequencing
I have proposed that IGO deaths are caused by a combination of exogenous shocks and
intrinsic institutional features including narrow scope, low centralisation and small size,
which reduce organizational capacity to cope with exogenous shocks. An additional
aspect of survivability is temporality. Unlike rationalist theories which portray states as
free to abandon institutions when they no longer maximise utility (Rixen and Viola,
2014), a core insight of HI is that institutions are subject to strong lock-in effects arising
from positive feedback processes and complementarities existing within broader insti-
tutional systems. These processes imply that, once a particular institutional path gets
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established, the cost of reversals increase drastically (North, 1990: 89; Pierson, 2004:
10). From this perspective, institutions may endure, not because they present efficient
solutions to collective action problems, ‘but simply because barriers to change grow over
time’ (Fioretos, 2017: 9,13).
By emphasising positive feedback processes, HI theories highlight the importance of
temporality in that it matters when institutions are introduced, in what order, and how
long they have been around – individually and jointly (Pierson, 2004: 1). HI scholarship
points to three types of positive feedback processes that strengthen institutional lock-in
over time. First, institutions in place for extended periods change the expectations of
social actors, leading them to adjust their policy preferences and routines in ways that
reinforce initial institutional choices (‘adaptive behaviour’) (Pierson, 2004: 85). Second,
institutions tend to accumulate knowledge and expertise, which leads to higher returns
from continuing use (‘learning effects’) (North, 1990: 95; Pierson, 2000: 253). Third,
institutions over time tend to develop strong exchange relationships that lead to the
development of complementary practices among other actors, thereby increasing joint
benefits within an institutional system (‘coordination effects’).13 All else being equal,
the longer an IGO is in operation, the greater adaptation, learning and coordination
effects it is likely to generate. Newly created IGOs, by contrast, are less likely to benefit
from widespread adaptation or learning effects, or to have developed strong exchange
relationships that embed them securely in their environments (see Stinchcombe, 1965 on
‘liability of youth’).14
Not merely the passage of time but also the timing and sequencing of events may
affect IGO mortality. As Pierson (2004) notes, a focus on path dependence raises a
conundrum: how can we think systematically about causal processes involving the
interaction of large systemic shocks (such as the onset of global war or economic
depression) and ongoing processes of institutional self-reinforcement, which are quite
separate from these shocks, but which embed IGOs more deeply in their environments
over time? One answer is to focus on timing. Just as small membership or low cen-
tralisation may incur higher penalties during times of crisis, the negative impact of
exogenous shocks may be more severe if they hit early in an IGO’s lifespan when it is
still relatively weakly established.15 An HI approach further suggests that when a par-
ticular process occurs sequentially matters insofar as ‘early developments become
deeply embedded in a particular environment, altering the resources and incentive
structures . . . of social actors, and thus changing subsequent events’ (Pierson, 2004: 64).
This implies that, just like early entry into a market can confer a leading market position
on firms (Baum and Shipilov, 2006), being first to facilitate cooperation on a given issue
may be advantageous for an IGO by triggering strong positive feedback processes
(Jupille et al., 2013: 211). Additional to benefits of absolute age, this suggests that IGOs
that are older relative to their peers are more likely to weather exogenous shocks thanks
to their ‘first-comer status’.
Hypothesis 3: Younger IGOs have higher mortality rates due to limited learning,
adaptation and coordination effects. The’ liability of youth’ is greatest in rapidly
changing environments.
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As with size, the notion that age reduces mortality may seem counterintuitive. Older
IGOs tend to have more formalised structures, standardised routines and greater accu-
mulation of sunk costs, which may reduce adaptability and discourage organisational
change (Levitt and March, 1988; Olson 1965; Ranger-Moore, 1997: 904). Also, since
organisations tend to reflect their founding environment, newly created IGOs seem
more likely to reflect current state preferences, whereas older IGOs would seem at
greater risk of obsolescence. Nevertheless, given some minimum element of periodic
institutional updating dynamics of path dependence suggest that such potential
‘liabilities of age’ will often be outweighed by positive feedback processes that anchor
IGOs more firmly in their environments over time. This means that the older an IGO is,
the older it is likely to grow. Far from tautological, this is precisely what institutional
path dependence entails.
Technical versus non-technical IGOs
Results from population-wide hazard analysis (Table 1, Appendix) show that IGOs
focused on ‘high politics’ matters such as security, judicial matters and trade have higher
mortality than IGOs that address purely technical or scientific matters. One reason might
be that ‘technical mandate’ is confounded with other survival enhancing factors such as
large size or high centralisation.16 However, hazard analysis reveals a statistically sig-
nificant effect for ‘technical mandate’ independent of other features, and comparison
across different IGO types does not show technical IGOs as outliers in terms of either
membership or centralisation (Table 2, Appendix). This leads me to propose that serving
a technical function in itself enhances an IGO’s life prospects. One reason could be that
technical IGOs are subject to strong positive feedback processes and thus incur high
substitution costs. Once states adopt specific technical standards and procedures as the
basis for international exchange (say, common standards for weights and measures, road
signs or aviation safety protocols), these become subject to significant coordination and
adaptation effects (Kaiser, 2014). Thus, despite having narrow scope, technical IGOs
may be subject to strong self-reinforcing effects, which embed them deeply in wider
institutional matrixes at both national and international levels and which make it par-
ticularly costly for states to abandon them.
A second reason for low mortality among IGOs with technical mandates may be that
they often fulfil practical needs (e.g. metrology, meteorology or postal services) for which
there is continued demand even in times of crisis. For example, since they typically have
fewer direct implications for relative power, IGOs with purely technical mandates may be
less vulnerable to abrupt power shifts than IGOs whose functions have direct distributive
effects (e.g. IGOs focused on trade, finance or military cooperation). This is not to
suggest that technical and scientific IGOs are ‘apolitical’. Some can become focus of
fierce distributive battles as illustrated by US President Trump’s threat in 2018 to
withdraw from the Universal Postal Union on grounds that its heavily subsidised postal
rates favoured Chinese traders. On average, however, IGOs with limited technical
mandates are less likely to become embroiled in political power struggles than non-
technical IGOs. Instead, technical organisations may be more vulnerable to issue-
specific technological shocks, which render their services obsolete. Thus, technical
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IGOs are likely both to have lower mortality than non-technical IGOs and to display a
different pattern of mortality insofar as terminations are less likely to closely track
geopolitical upheavals.
Hypothesis 4: Technical IGOs have lower overall mortality and are less acutely
vulnerable to geopolitical shocks than non-technical organisations.
Empirics: exogenous change and IGO death
From population-wide statistical analysis, we know that periods of geopolitical and
economic instability are broadly associated with higher IGO termination rates. We
also know that many IGOs survive wars and economic crises. In the previous
section, I identified intrinsic factors that I hypothesise influence IGO termination.
These causal factors are separate from, but complementary to, exogenous shocks.
Thus, while IGOs with intrinsic ‘liabilities’ such as small membership or young age
may incur only slight penalties in stable environments (see Ranger-More, 1997),
such features are likely to render organisations particularly vulnerable during peri-
ods of rapid exogenous change.
Given the hypothesised interaction of intrinsic and exogenous factors, a good basis for
testing my hypotheses is to examine changes in the IGO population during a period of
high environmental stress, which affects a large segment of the population. Focusing on
a period during which large numbers of IGOs are subject to a similar systemic shock
allows me to check for the presence/absence of intrinsic features assumed to help some
organisations cope with stress while others succumb. Results can later be refined by
examining the incidence and profile of IGO terminations during a period of relative
environmental stability (on my theory terminations should be rarer, and the disparity in
death rates between IGOs with different features associated with high/low adaptability
less pronounced).
Identifying systemic shocks
I hypothesise that IGO deaths are caused by exogenous shocks, which alter state
preferences and reduce the utility of existing institutions either to powerful states or
wider groups. Exogenous shocks may take different forms (a point to which I return
later). However, a commonly cited basis for changing preferences regarding inter-
national cooperation are sudden shifts in relative power. To observe the impact of
power shifts on IGO terminations, I build on Gunitsky’s (2011) measure of ‘power
volatility’ reflecting annual changes in relative power among major states. Using
Composite Index of National Capabilities scores, Gunitsky identifies two periods of
extreme power volatility – 1917–1922 and 1940–1947 – and one period of lesser
fluctuation, 1989–1995. However, Gunitsky’s analysis shows power volatility climbing
sharply from 1914 and remaining high until 1923 (Gates et al., 2007: 19 have a similar
finding). I thus identify three periods of high global power-volatility: 1914–1923,
1939–1949 and 1989–1997. To capture other aspects of geopolitical change (additional
to shifts in demographic, military and industrial strength, which are the main com-
ponents of extant measures), I also include the Great Depression (1929–1938) as a
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period of economic turmoil, and 1956–1967 as a period of rapid decolonisation across
Africa involving significant shifts in political power.
The list of exogenous shocks in Figure 4 is not exhaustive. It omits many shocks at
regional or sub-regional level, and sector-specific shocks like the international oil crises
during the 1970s. However, by identifying systemic shocks that affect large segments of
the IGO population, it provides a good starting point for systematically observing var-
iation in the impact of exogenous shocks on IGO mortality.
As illustrated in Table 3, periods of high global power-volatility display elevated ter-
mination ratios (18%–35% of incumbent population per decade) whereas ‘low stress’
periods have lower mortality rates (0%–19%), supporting both Hypotheses 1a and 1b. To
see whether technical IGOs are less vulnerable to systemic power shifts than other
organisations, I compare termination ratios for technical/non-technical IGOs. Termination
ratios for non-technical IGOs soar as high as 46% and 38% during the World Wars,
whereas mortality rates for technical IGOs remain lower (11% and 16%). By contrast, the
highest death ratios among technical IGOs are during the Great Depression (29%) and
during 1956–1967 (19%). This suggests that technical and non-technical IGOs may be






























1900–1913 Low 13 1 3% 4% 0% 3 / 22 -
1914–1923 High 10 16 35% 46% 11% 22 / 23 35%
1924–1928 Low 5 0 0% 0% 0% - / 21 0
1929–1938 High 10 15 22% 24% 29% 15/ 22 26%
1939–1949 High 11 19 27% 38% 16% 22 / 29 55%
1950–1955 Low 6 11 19% 10% 4% 16/ 21 11%
1956–1967 Low/High** 12 22 19%** 19% 19% 20 / 21 16%
1968–1978 Low 11 16 8% 12% 6% 9/ 22 15%
1979–1988 Low 10 15 6% 7% 4% 19 / 22 5%
1989–1998 High 9 48 18% 18% 9% 22/ 29 10%
1999–2016 Low 16 33 6% 10% 3% 22/ 31 -
*This measure captures the age of IGOs at the start of each period.
**Terminations during this period are predominantly in Africa and Asia, which is also where geopolitical
upheaval is concentrated.
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vulnerable to different exogenous shocks (Hypothesis 4) and supports treating the two
types as separate sub-populations in further analysis. As predicted (Hypothesis 3), average
prior lifespan is higher for surviving IGOs during all periods, but relative death ratios for
young IGOs (<10 years) increase significantly during volatile periods, meaning that
‘liability of youth’ is especially pronounced during periods of geopolitical instability.
By isolating periods of high volatility in global power distributions, the analysis in
this section confirms that rapid geopolitical change is strongly correlated with IGO
death. But without closer scrutiny, we cannot tell how power volatility impacts the
mortality of different IGOs. In the remainder of this section, I therefore conduct a
structured comparison of the periods 1939–1949 (a period of rapidly shifting power
among major powers) and 1968–1978 (a period of relative stability at global level, see
Table 3 above). I begin with a brief statistical comparison of the two periods in order to
test hypotheses regarding organisational age and adaptability. This analysis also serves
to establish parameters for more focused case studies to assess the plausibility of
observed statistical relationships between specific variables.
In the previous section, I identified intrinsic factors including small size, narrow scope,
low centralisation and young age as likely causes of IGO collapse during crisis. Some of
these factors may be correlated. For example, younger IGOs may on average have smaller
membership. Yet, hazard analysis shows a statistically significant effect for each factor
separately, suggesting the merit of exploring their impact through further medium-n and
case-based analysis to tease out their individual and combined effects. Relevant institutional
features are operationalised as follows: centralisation is measured on a scale from 0 to 3
according to whether an IGO provides centralised dispute resolution, monitoring and
enforcement. To determine the scope of an IGO’s policy portfolio, I build on a list of 26
policy areas set out by Hooghe and co-authors (2017) (see details in Codebook). IGOs whose
mandate span more than three policy areas are classified as ‘General-Purpose’.17 Size of
IGO membership and age are both recorded at the beginning of each historical period.
IGO death: 1939–1949
Given high termination rates during the 1930s, just 62 IGOs were in existence worldwide
in 1939 (versus 70 a decade earlier). Of these, 17 died between 1939 and 1949. Another
two IGOs were founded and terminated during the period, bringing total terminations to
19 (Table 4).
When considering what (if anything) distinguished fatalities from survivors, the most
conspicuous factors are geography and function. The majority of IGOs that collapsed had
either exclusively European membership or a preponderance of European members. By
contrast, regional or inter-regional IGOs in other parts of the world (e.g. the Americas,
Africa and the Commonwealth) were less likely to succumb. As reported earlier, technical
IGOs had lower death rates (16%) than non-technical IGOs (38%). (see Table 3)
A third striking factor is length of prior lifespan. The average age (as of 1939) of IGOs
that terminated was 22 years versus 29 years for survivors, and mortality among IGOs aged
<10 years was 55% (versus 27% average death rate), meaning that IGOs that were newly
established when war broke out were significantly more likely to perish (Table 3.). IGOs
that terminated had on average 20 members versus 23 for survivors (Table 4). Policy scope
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did not differ markedly between casualties and survivors, and centralisation was higher
among terminating IGOs (0.6 versus 0.4) providing mixed support for Hypothesis 2.
In addition to confirming the negative impact of large power shifts on non-technical
IGOs specifically and the liability of youth, closer analysis of the period 1939–1949
draws attention to a small group of long-lived IGOs, which should be of particular
interest to IO scholars. Nineteen of forty-five IGOs that persisted through the period
1939–1949 were founded prior to 1914. Not only did these organisations survive two
World Wars, but fourteen of these ‘double-war-veterans’ are still operative today. When
considering what may account for the durability of these organisations despite profound
changes in the conditions that gave rise to them, three factors stand out: first, most focus
on narrowly technical issues related to standards and measures, scientific research, or
postal services. None focus on security or trade (confirming Hypothesis 4). Second, with
an average age of 27 years by 1914 (52 years by 1939), these organisations were already
firmly established when global conflict broke out (supporting Hypothesis 3). Further-
more, their advanced age – in absolute and relative terms – suggests that these IGOs
likely benefitted from ‘first-comer’ status. Organisations such as the International Tel-
ecommunication Union (ITU; 1865–present), the Universal Postal Union (1874–present)
or the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875–present) were all first to
facilitate broad international cooperation on specific problems. ‘Pioneer’ status allowed
these organisations to shape norms and practices of cooperation in their respective fields
and prompted early adaptation by other actors which further reinforced the rules and
norms advanced by these organisations and fortified them vis-à-vis competing frame-
works. To illustrate, the ITU has been in continuous operation since 1865 whereas later
IGOs dealing with telecommunication (e.g. the Radio-Telegraph Union, 1906–1932; the
International Telegraph Committee, 1925-1956; the International Long-distance Tele-
phone Council, 1925–1956; the Inter-American Radio Office, 19371–1963) have all had
shorter life-spans, eventually ceding their functions to the ITU.
IGO death: 1969–1978
Compared to 1939–1949, the years 1969–1978 featured limited power volatility. The
global IGO population in 1969 stood at 177. Of these, 16 died by 1978 (9%) (Table 4).



























Survivors 45 70% 21 (47%) 0.4 1.96 23.0
Deaths 19 30% 4 (21%) 0.6 1.89 20.2 40% 35% 15%
1968–1978
Survivors 161 91% 49 (30%) 0.76 1.30 28.4
Deaths 16 9% 3 (19%) 0.56 1.44 8.1 15% 5% 0%
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As during other periods, technical IGOs terminated less frequently (Hypothesis 4).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, surviving IGOs had an average of 28 members versus 8 for
IGO fatalities, whereas scope and centralisation scores were only slightly higher among
surviving IGOs (0.8 versus 0.6), once again providing mixed support for Hypothesis 2.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, surviving IGOs had an average prior lifespan of 22 years
versus just 9 years for IGOs that terminated. However, termination ratios for newly
founded IGOs remained lower than during 1939–1949 (15%). (Table 3).
It is important to note that although the years 1969–1978 featured relative geopolitical
stability globally, this does not rule out significant regional instability. On closer scru-
tiny, several IGO deaths can be linked directly to local and regional power shifts. For
example, the International Red Locust Control Service was dissolved in 1970 due to
growing tension between South Africa and Portugal and a group of newly independent
African states that withdrew from the organisation to form an independent grouping
(Byaruhanga, 1999). Similarly, the Asian & Pacific Council (founded in 1966 to contain
the spread of Communism in Asia) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (a US-led
collective-defence treaty to ‘counter Communist aggression’) both dissolved after Sino-
American rapprochement robbed these organisations of their purpose (Reinalda, 2009:
372). Thus, while low power volatility at global level led to low overall death rates,
individual deaths can be linked to local power shifts.
Detailed comparative historical analysis in this section confirms that power volatility
takes a greater toll on non-technical IGOs and that ‘liability of youth’ is higher during
periods of high environmental stress. It also shows that whereas smaller IGOs are more
prone to terminate overall, the ‘protective effects’ of having a large membership may be
partly cancelled out by dramatic shifts in power distributions, such as during World War
II. As expected, technical IGOs have lower mortality during all periods surveyed, except
during the Great Depression and from 1956 to 1967. Looking closer at technical IGOs
that terminated in 1956–1967, it emerges that several brought together colonial powers
and former colonies to address technical issues such as collection of statistics or agri-
cultural research. Despite their technical mandates, they may have been seen as tools of
foreign influence, which may explain their higher termination rates during this time.
Further analysis is needed to determine what explains unusually high termination rates
among technical IGOs during the Great Depression, but acute lack of funding seems a
plausible hypothesis. Contrary to expectation, neither broad scope nor centralisation
significantly reduce mortality during the periods under examination.18
Case studies
Statistical analysis of the global IGO population across time confirms that geopolitical
upheaval kills many IGOs. It also confirms that IGOs that terminate are on average
younger and smaller than enduring organisations, and more likely to focus on ‘political’
matters, such as security or trade, than on purely technical matters. Yet how precisely
this contributes to their undoing remains uncertain. By identifying typical causal effects
across a population, statistical analysis relies on a probability-based definition of
causality where a ‘cause’ is simply a value on a variable that makes certain outcomes
more likely (Mahoney, 2008: 2–4). To gain a deeper understanding of how specific
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causal factors contribute to IGO death, this section therefore supplements statistical
analysis with focused case studies that seek to trace the context and mechanisms through
which specific factors – jointly or singly – lead to IGO termination.
My case selection abides by two criteria. First, by including cases of both terminated
and enduring IGOs, I provide stronger tests of individual hypotheses. Second, by selecting
both cases that are strongly predicted by the statistical model (‘typical survivors’ or typical
casualties and seemingly anomalous cases of IGOs that persist despite adverse conditions
(‘unlikely survivors’) or that perish despite seemingly favourable conditions (‘unexpected
deaths’), I seek to discover potential variables omitted from the large-n study, which may
be influencing results, and thereby generate new hypotheses for future research (on use of
‘least likely’ cases to generate new research questions, see Levy, 2007: 202; Rohlfing,
2008). Based on these criteria, I select four cases for in-depth study.
International Bureau of Education, 1929–1969
My first case, the International Bureau of Education (IBE), fits the profile of a ‘typical
survivor’. Founded in 1925 as a private organisation by the Institute Rosseau, IBE was
constituted as an IGO in 1929, becoming the first IO to facilitate exchange of infor-
mation and research on education. During the 10 years prior to World War II, IBE was
highly active despite a limited budget and staff (Rosselló). In 1934, the Bureau founded
the International Conference on Public Education (ICPE) – an annual intergovernmental
forum focused on educational development. Thanks to the ICPE’s considerable success,
IBE’s membership, which spanned Europe and Latin America, grew rapidly from 12 in
1929 to 15 by 1939, and 20 by the end of the war, providing a broad base of international
support.
During the war, as it became impossible to convene the ICPE, IBE’s Secretariat
created the Service of Intellectual Assistance to Prisoners of War (SIAP) providing
books and intellectual services to prisoners of war. In 1940, as funding grew scarce, IBE
began to issue postal stamps to fund the project. By the end of the war, it had distributed
more than 600,000 books and organised ‘Internment Universities’ in many prisoner
camps. Rather than falling dormant during the war, as it happened to many technical
IGOs, IBE thus successfully refocused its activities and adapted its funding model to
meet wartime needs.
Besides its operational flexibility, which stemmed from low dependence on state
funding, an important factor in IBE’s survival was its apolitical, technical nature, which
insulated it from geopolitical strife and distributive conflict. Created to provide a forum
‘neutral from national, political, philosophical and religious point of view in a strictly
scientific and objective state of mind’ (IBE Statutes, 1929), and focused primarily on
exchange of information, IBE’s activities were politically unobtrusive. This apolitical
profile grew increasingly important as IBE’s membership expanded. To meet the
challenges of a large, diverse membership, IBE ‘ceaselessly stayed clear of interfering
with the educational freedom of partners’. Rather than pushing for standardisation of
global educational development, the Bureau sought ‘to take into account the specific
needs of each region . . . in order to shape the worldwide educational movement’, and
strove to ‘promote universal education without interfering with local priorities’
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(Hofstetter and Schneuwly, 2013: 217; ICPE II, 1934: 158). Internationally, IBE like-
wise remained politically neutral. In 1963, a group of newly independent African nations
sought to use the worldwide platform of the ICPE to protest colonial policies by
demanding that Portugal be excluded from the yearly conference. Yet IBE’s directorship
emphatically argued that banning a convened member on political grounds would
contradict IBE’s ‘technical, scientific and universal features’ and insisted that ‘other
organizations could take on that responsibility’ (Hofstetter and Schneuwly, 2013: 228).
A third basis of IBE’s ability to weather geopolitical change lay in its high infor-
mational and technical expertise. Before becoming an IGO in 1929, IBE had already
organised dozens of international congresses, working closely with the League of
Nations, the ILO and several international research associations (Rosselló). Prior to the
war, its ‘pedagogical tour of the world’, which collected data on national educational
reforms and issued recommendations, reached more than 70 countries19 and provided a
crucial resource for national education reformers. Thus, when UNESCO was created in
1945, IBE helped to develop its education programmes, building on its decade-long
experience. By 1952, a permanent joint commission was established to facilitate
cooperation between IBE and UNESCO, and in 1969, IBE formally joined UNESCO
becoming the first of UNESCO’s independent Category I Institutes, which meant it
retained a large degree of operational independence. Thus, consistent with my expec-
tations, IBE’s technical mandate and apolitical profile was key to its survival. The fact
that IBE had achieved a relatively settled status by the time war broke out and benefitted
from a large and geographically diverse membership further helped its survival, as did
close ties to other international institutions to whom its services remained important
despite geopolitical conflict.
The European Commission for the Danube, 1856–1939
In contrast to IBE, which survived World War II, the European Commission for the
Danube (CED) was an early (and theoretically well-predicted) casualty of the war (a
‘typical death’). Created to keep major European waterways open to traffic and com-
merce, the European River Commissions were of great economic and militarily
importance. The international conventions governing navigation on the Rhine, Elbe and
Danube formed integral parts of earlier European peace settlements, starting with the
Vienna Peace Treaty of 1815, which guaranteed freedom of navigation in Europe, and
extended by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 (‘Act of Navigation’). During World War II,
navigation on the Danube was controlled by Germany and Austria-Hungary who used
the river as a base for warships. Thus, at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, ‘in an
effort to block the resurgence of German or Russian power’, the Allies’ Supreme Council
ruled that membership of the CED should henceforth include riparian states plus Britain,
France and Italy in order (to balance German power), while Russia together with Turkey
were expelled (Popper, 1943).
During the 1920s and 1930s, the CED undertook important engineering works to
improve navigability of the Danube (opcit.). However, as World War II loomed, the
Commission’s fate once again grew uncertain. From the spring 1936, German parts of
Danube were controlled by Nazi Germany, and on 14 November 1936 Germany
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announced it would cease cooperation with all the river commissions established by the
Versailles Treaty.20 According to British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, ‘Germany
justifies this step on the ground that the Articles in question were dictated to Germany and
not freely negotiated . . . and clarifies that, for the future, national treatment will be
accorded on a basis of reciprocity on German waterways to the vessels of all States living
at peace with Germany’.21 Not content to have renounced cooperation, in August 1940 the
Reich unilaterally declared the dissolution of the CED noting that ‘this ends the existence
of a valuable source of information for the Allies on the economic situation in Danubian
territory’ (NYT, 30-Aug-1940).
Once the war ended, the victorious Allies convened to discuss re-establishing free-
dom of navigation of the Danube. In 1948, negotiations began in Belgrade about
resuming operation of the CED. However, new geo-political realities, specifically the
onset of Cold War conflict, made agreement impossible. The USSR, which now con-
trolled the votes of all but one riparian state, categorically rejected proposals by France,
Britain and the USA to restore freedom of navigation within a revised CED (Reinalda,
2009: 107–109). Eventually a new Convention for the Danube was agreed under Soviet
leadership without participation of the Western powers, and the commitment to free
navigation soon withered.
Serving a geopolitically important function and having a small and geographically
concentrated membership at the heart of a global conflict, the CED’s downfall during
World War II seems unsurprising. Its termination fits the model of a rising challenger
(Germany before the war; USSR in its aftermath) seeking to overturn an established
regime in order to replace it with a new framework that better suits its interests. In this
respect, the CED’s demise contrasts sharply with the Central Commission for Navigation
of the Rhine (f.1815-) which – thanks to its different geography – remained under control
of western Allies and therefore was able to continue its functions after the war. The
different fates of the two River Commissions highlight that it is often the narrow interests
of powerful states that determine which international institutions survive major wars.
However, the long lifespans of both River Commissions also illustrate other aspects of
IGO survivability. Both the CED and Rhine Commission had high centralisation. In
particular, the CED was unique among 20th-century IGOs in having far-ranging
enforcement powers, which included authority to collect tolls and dues from ships, to
borrow money on private markets and to issue regulations with binding effect without
approval by member-states (Krehbiel, 1918). Although they did not prevent the death of
the CED in a geopolitically divided Europe, these autonomous powers helped the CED
weather earlier geopolitical crises, as when, in 1866, the Commission found itself close
to bankruptcy due to the Austro-Prussian war and raised funds by issuing bonds, offering
the river tolls as security (ibid.). The ability to contract private loans also allowed the
CED to stay solvent during the 1930s when the Great Depression led to a dramatic
reduction in trade-related river transport (Potter, 1943).
International Copyright Organization, 1952–1971
My third case, the International Copyright Organization (ICO), exemplifies an ‘unlikely
death’. With 14 member-states spanning four continents, operating during a period of
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low global power volatility, and addressing a fairly ‘low-politics’ matter, the ICO sta-
tistically had good survival chances. Yet closer examination places the organisation at
the heart of an impending struggle for a New International Economic Order, which soon
made it untenable (Drahos, 2002).
The ICO was founded by Art.11 of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) in
1952. The UCC was negotiated within UNESCO as an alternative to the existing
International Copyright Convention (Berne Convention, 1886), which was seen by many
developing countries to privilege developed, copyright-exporting nations. However, the
UCC failed to satisfy developing nations’ concerns, and the push for specific provisions
in their favour continued to gain momentum during a series of conferences in the 1960s
(Bannerman, 2011; Olian, 1974: 96). Illustrative was the African Study Meeting on
Copyright held at Brazzaville, 1963, which declared that ‘international copyright con-
ventions are designed, in their present form, to meet the needs of countries which are
exporters of intellectual works; these conventions . . . require review in the light of the
specific needs of the African continent’.22
The 1963 Brazzaville Declaration encapsulates the growing struggle to rewrite the rules
of international copyright governance. The existing system had been shaped by the
imperial power of the UK, France, Italy and Spain, and by Switzerland and Germany,
which housed major international publishers (Bannerman, 2011). By contrast, most
developing countries were net copyright importers, dependent on translation and repro-
duction of foreign literature. During the 1960s, developing countries called for improved
access to educational and scientific knowledge at lower cost, and for mechanisms to
support the development of local publishing industries in order to reduce reliance on
foreign works (Olian, 1943: 89).
In 1967, the Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference convened to consider
reforms to the 1886 Berne Convention. A strong stimulus to reform was a growing sense
of rivalry between the UCC and the Berne Convention, which competed for legitimacy and
members (Olian, 1943: 81). The Stockholm conference agreed on a ‘Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries’, which entitled developing countries to enter reservations to certain
terms of copyright protection for a 10-year period, and widened rights of translation and
reproduction for educational works.23 Yet, these concessions failed to resolve the conflict.
For developed countries, the Stockholm Protocol represented a threat to copyright gov-
ernance as it had evolved over the past century, and a confiscation of the rights of individual
copyright holders. Thus, many refrained from signing it (Olian, 1943: 102). For developing
countries, the Protocol failed to meet their core needs insofar as neither the Berne Con-
vention nor the UCC offered sufficient provisions for reduced royalty payments or financial
assistance to developing countries to meet such payments (Bannerman, 2011).
To resolve the impasse, two diplomatic conferences were convened in 1971 aimed to
revise both the Berne Convention and the UCC and thereby prevent a breakdown of the
international copyright system (opcit.). The result was the creation of the new World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which took over management of both
existing conventions.24 Organisationally WIPO inherited the administrative structures
and assets of the International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which
had administered the Berne Convention since 1893, whereas the smaller and more
recently established ICO was dissolved. The ICO thus fits the profile of an IGO, which,
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although it dealt with a relatively technical matter, was undermined by growing political
and distributional struggles in the wake of decolonisation (as such it may provide a
model to explain other casualties among African technical IGOs during the 1950s and
1960s). Compared to the older and better-established Bureau of the Berne Convention,
the ICO was less able to endure in an inhospitable environment.
Bank for International Settlements, 1930–present
At first sight, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) seems an ‘unlikely survivor’
of both the Great Depression and the period 1939–1949. Founded in 1930 by Germany,
Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, Japan and Switzerland to oversee payment of war
reparations imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty (Art.3, BIS Statute), the BIS
also had a second purpose: to promote cooperation among central banks and to facilitate
international financial operations (Art.4-BIS Statute). Created during a period of global
financial turmoil, addressing a highly politicised issue (war reparations), and having a
narrow membership of mainly European states most of whom would fight on opposite
sides as war broke out less than a decade from BIS’ founding, the Bank would seem
highly vulnerable to termination. BIS’ survival is the more surprising given that the Bank
came under direct attack by the most world’s powerful country, the USA, which spe-
cifically demanded its dissolution (Bernholz, 2009). Yet despite these unpromising
beginnings, the BIS survived multiple crises and remains operational to this day. How?
The first challenge to the BIS’ existence resulted from the breakdown of the Gold
Standard, and the termination of German reparation payments (Lausanne Agreement,
July 1932) – both consequences of the Great Depression. These events made the BIS’
main task of facilitating reparation payments obsolete and led to a 50% reduction in net
profits between 1932 and 1939 (Bernholz, 2009). Robbed of its chief purpose, the BIS
instead focused on its second statutory task; fostering cooperation between central banks.
For this purpose, it increased its emphasis on information and research activities
(Fabianni and Pattison, 2001). As political tensions deepened in Europe, the BIS was
also instrumental in helping European central banks transfer part of their monetary
reserves overseas – to London and New York. Its early survival was thus ensured by the
broad and flexible range of its tasks (Bernholz, 2009). Indeed, ‘had it not been for Article
3 . . . BIS would have disintegrated in 1932 when the Lausanne Agreement brought war
reparations to an end’ (Fratianni and Pattison, 2001: 199).
In September 1939, as war broke out between Britain, France and Germany (all BIS
members), BIS’ Board of Directors decided to suspend meetings for the duration of the
war but resolved that the Bank would stay open, conducting its operations in a ‘neutral
manner’ that ‘advantages neither side’ (BIS.Org, 2019). But as conflict deepened, evi-
dence mounted that the Bank was in fact conducting operations that specifically bene-
fitted Germany and the Axis powers. During the war, BIS’ business declined sharply,
and in July 1944 the UN Monetary & Financial Conference at Bretton Woods which
established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank adopted ‘Res-
olution-V’ calling for the liquidation of the BIS at ‘the earliest possible moment’ (opcit.).
The chief architects of Bretton Woods, Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury and
John Maynard Keynes, strongly opposed the BIS due to its wartime assistance to
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Germany, and because they saw it as an obstacle to a new international monetary order
with the IMF at its centre (Frantianni and Pattison, 2001: 201). Nevertheless, in 1946, the
BIS’ Board of Directors held their first post-war meeting to decide how to defend the
Bank. Maurice Frere, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium, travelled to
Washington to lobby American policymakers (Lebor, 2014), and in May 1948 the
Washington Agreement was signed whereby the BIS consented to reimburse looted gold
from the German Reich to the Allied Tripartite Commission.25 Soon after, Resolution-V
was set aside. ‘Quietly, carefully, barely noticed by the outside world, the BIS returned to
business as usual’ (Lebor, 2014).
Having narrowly survived World War II, the key to BIS’ long-term survival was its
significant expertise on European monetary and financial issues. During the 1930s and
1940s, the BIS had established itself as an instrument of European central banks,
whereas the IMF and World Bank both had worldwide focus (Bernholz, 2009). After the
war, the BIS continued to enjoy strong support among European central bankers who
found that, rather than duplicate the functions of the IMF, the BIS facilitated imple-
mentation of the Bretton Woods system in a European context (Auboin, 1955: 17). When
the Benelux countries, France and Italy struck an Agreement on Multilateral Monetary
Compensation in 1947, they invited the BIS to act as technical agent. In 1950, when a
European Payments Union was established to restore European currency convertibility
within the framework of the Marshall Plan, the BIS was again the managing agent – a
role it repeated within the EMU, 1979–1994.
Scrutinising the BIS’ history, two factors seem integral to its ability to weather
dramatic environmental change. First, its immediate wartime survival was facilitated by
the range of its tasks and, in particular, by the value of its services to different stake-
holder groups. Beyond contracting governments, governors of European central banks
were keen to maintain an institution where they could cooperate free of political
influences, and lobbied strongly for its survival (Bernholz, 2009). A second factor
underpinning BIS’ survival was its ability to finance activities independently of gov-
ernments, which saved it from bankruptcy during World War II (ibid.). This aspect
mirrors the narrative of the IBE (and the CED during the 19th century), and contrasts
with many IGOs whose work became practically infeasible during the Great Depression
and WWII due to lacking funds and resulting inability of representatives to meet (e.g. the
International Exchange Service, 1886–1939; the International Institute of Commerce,
1919–1943; the International Commission on Teaching of Mathematics, 1908–1939).
Together, these cases suggest that an important aspect of survivability is whether an IGO
is financially and operationally autonomous from its member-states. This aspect of
adaptability is only partly reflected in the broad measures of centralisation that underlie
my large-n analysis but suggest an important theme for future analysis.
Summary and conclusions
IGO deaths are a recurrent theme of international politics. Nevertheless, there have been
few scholarly attempts to explain their causes. This article has sought to establish a the-
oretical and empirical foundation for explaining IGO terminations. Given that IGO deaths
are an understudied phenomenon about which few general facts are known, this study has
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combined population-wide analysis with focused historical case studies to establish a firm
empirical ground for analysis. My analysis demonstrates the need to integrate theoretical
explanations focused on exogenous factors (such as environmental changes wrought by
war or economic depression) with an account focused on intrinsic institutional features.
Exogenous shocks undermine many IGOs, but they do not endanger all IGOs equally.
Rather, institutional features such as large membership, mature age, or first-comer status
can enhance organisational ability to cope with environmental turbulence. My analysis
further shows that IGO death or survival often owe to the timing and sequencing of
institution-building efforts, a dimension that might remain hidden from view by studying
only enduring IGOs as has been the norm in existing scholarship.
Both my statistical and case study findings support my theoretical conjectures
regarding the combined role of exogenous shocks and intrinsic liabilities such as ‘high
politics’ functions, young age or narrow membership in leading to IGO terminations.
However, the case studies also illustrate the diverse paths to IGO death, and thereby
underscore the difficulty of formulating a single ‘grand theory’ of IGO death. By pro-
viding a longitudinal view of individual organisational trajectories, the case studies
illustrate that an IGO with a particular profile may be ‘robust’ in the sense that is immune
to most forms of environmental stress and yet be highly vulnerable to one specific
disturbance (Young, 2010: 6). This was the case, for example, with the Danube Com-
mission, which survived several armed conflicts between member states before finally
succumbing to Europe’s Cold War Division.26
Historians might seize on such evidence to insist that the specific circumstances sur-
rounding individual IGO deaths render them unique and therefore not subject to general
explanation. But although individual paths to termination may vary, population-wide
analysis reveals clear historical regularities. Throughout the past two centuries, IGOs
that have succumbed to exogenous change have been on average smaller, younger and
have served more easily ‘politicised’ functions than surviving counterparts. Combining
statistical analysis and historical case studies has thus allowed me to draw a distinction
between ‘proximate’ and underlying causes of IGO death: while proximate causes often
appear unique, population-wide analysis reveals underlying structural features that make
some types of IGOs consistently more vulnerable to termination than others.
Although they reveal strong regularities in historical patterns of IGOs death, my
findings suggest that rather than having a single cause, many IGO terminations involve
multiple causes. Individually, these causes (or ‘risk factors’) may be neither necessary
nor sufficient but work in combination to produce the outcome of organisational death
(Mahoney, 2008: 7,13). Furthermore, different combinations of risk factors may lead to
the same outcome: termination. Thus, one IGO may succumb to environmental stress
due to being newly established and poorly anchored in its environment, whereas another
is vulnerable due to small size. The causal significance of multiple risk factors (‘equi-
finality’) presents a challenge for theory building. Equifinality, however, does not imply
that IGO deaths are ‘random’ or beyond general explanation. Rather, the challenge is to
identify and determine the relative importance and empirical bounds of different causal
drivers. For example, my analysis suggests that whereas intrinsic factors such as small
size or young age may matter less for survivability during relatively stable periods, these
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factors become causally more significant during periods of rapid geopolitical change,
when organisations come under strong pressure to adapt.
Overall, my population-wide analysis indicates that the historical development of the
global IGO population conforms to a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model whereby institu-
tional change occurs through sequences of relative continuity and stability, ‘punctuated’
by major crises which rapidly undermine existing institutions (Fioretos, 2017). During
the former periods, low environmental volatility allows IGOs to entrench themselves
deeply in their environments through positive feedback mechanisms, while during the
latter periods, sudden shifts in state power or interests may cause existing institutions to
become dislodged. While broadly accurate, this picture is, however, incomplete. As
Fioretos (2017) observers, the model of discontinuous change associated with punc-
tuated equilibrium models risks concealing important continuities in institutions across
ruptures. Only by paying attention to underlying processes of institutional ‘lock-in’ can
we explain why some IGOs terminate during crises while others persist, growing still
more robust over time.
An implicit goal of this study has been to draw attention to a large number of IGOs
which, due to growing defunct, have slipped out of focus in IO scholarship. There is, I
believe, much to be gained from this exercise. First, careful identification of the pro-
cesses that undermine IGOs can help to explain historical failures of international
cooperation. Second, the population of defunct IGOs offers a rich source of historical
data against which theoretical conjectures about ‘institutional robustness’ can be sys-
tematically tested. This may lead us to reassess prominent theories of institutional
endurance and reveal new outcomes of interest, thereby offering opportunities for
extending existing theoretical work in new directions.
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1. Inter alia the Brussels Treaty Organization, 1948–1954; the South East Asian Treaty Orga-
nization, 1954–1977; the Australia, New Zeeland, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS),
1951–1984; the Central Treaty Organization, 1955–1979 and the Western European Union,
1954–2011.
2. Notable exceptions include Shanks et al. (1996) who analyse causes of decline in the IGO
population from 1982 to 1991; Abbott et al. (2016) who analyse how changing environmental
conditions have facilitated the rise of private transnational regulatory organisations at the
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expense of IGOs; and Gray (2018) who analyses variation in the vitality of regional economic
organisations.
3. The widespread tendency to study enduring IOs is partly determined by prior theoretical
assumptions, but an element of optical fallacy may also be at work: because enduring IOs
endure, they are easier to identify and analyse than their defunct counterparts, leading to
systematic bias in favour of studying surviving organisations.
4. Gray’s (2018) study of the vitality of regional economic organisations provides the most
comprehensive analysis of robustness/frailty in a larger segment of the IGO population.
5. The DIGO-2018 data are introduced in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2018).
6. My measure of centralisation is based on data from Westerwinter and Reinsberg (2019) who
code the presence of dispute settlement, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for all IGOs.
7. This definition excludes bilateral treaty organisations and IGOs formed by non-state parties,
as well as IGO ‘emanations’ – that is, IGO created by other IGOs.
8. A period of at least 10 years during which an IGO shows no sign of activity is widely
considered an indication of tacit agreement to regard it as terminated. Kohen (2011: 352);
Pevehouse et al. (2004).
9. In Cox proportional hazard analysis, the hazard ratio is the ratio of fatalities corresponding to
different values of an explanatory variable. E.g. we may find that IGOs of a specific type, say
Security Organisations, die at three times the rate per unit time as the control population:
hazard ratio ¼ 3. See Box-Steffermeier and Drefus (1997).
10. Organisational IR literature has found that centralisation increases IOs’ capacity for auton-
omous action, which may in turn enhance institutional resilience (e.g. Bernholz, 2009; Bar-
nett and Finnemore, 2004; Haftel and Thompson 2006: 260; Olson, 1965).
11. A large literature holds that large group size reduces capacity for collective action (e.g. Oye,
1986; Downs et al., 1996).
12. Individually, these causes may be neither necessary nor sufficient, but work in combi-
nation to produce organisational failure. In short, they are ‘probability raisers’ (Mahoney,
2008: 7,13).
13. Coordination effects obtain when the value of an activity increases with more actors adopting
the same option. Pierson (2004: 24 l); North (1990: 95); Fioretos (2011: 377).
14. Note: Environmental embeddedness is not a direct causal effect of age. Rather, age serves as a
proxy for the path-dependent processes, which embed IGOs more deeply in their environ-
ments over time.
15. Ranger-More (1997) makes a similar point in regard to age dependence in firms.
16. Virtually all technical IGOs have narrow, task-specific mandates, so I rule out ‘broad
mandate’.
17. Whereas the population-wide hazard analysis reported in Table 1 (Appendix) distinguishes
only between general-purpose/task-specific IGOs, this section provides a more detailed mea-
sure counting the number of specific policy issues addressed by an IGO.
18. Contrary to my prediction, broad scope did not greatly shield IGOs from termination during
either period. However, population-wide hazard analysis indicates that broad scope has a
positive effect for the population as a whole. An explanation may be that ‘General-Purpose’
IGOs are often political in nature, committing their members to shared goals such as ‘closer
political integration’ (Lenz et al., 2014: 147). For this reason, General-Purpose IGOs may






22. Preamble to the recommendations adopted by the Brazzaville Conference, 10 August 1963.
Quoted in Olian (1943: 95).
23. Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm (1967), vol. 1.
24. Records of the Conference for Revision of the UCC, UNESCO House, Paris, 5–24 July 1971;
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention for Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris, 24 July 1971.
25. In 1948, BIS returned 3.7 tonnes of looted gold received during the war from the German
Reichsbank to the Allied Tripartite Commission, and the ‘Liquidation Resolution’ was set
aside. Financial Times, 13 July 2013.
26. A similar story can be told about the International Commission of the Cape Spartel Light in
Tangier (f.1865), which emerged unscathed from two world wars during which its members
fought on opposite sides before quickly unravelling in 1958 as a result of Moroccan
independence.
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